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I. INTRODUCTION
A neurologist with abdominal pain goes to see a gastroenterologist for
treatment. The gastroenterologist asks the neurologist where it hurts. The
neurologist replies, "In my head, of course."1 Indeed, while we can feel pain
throughout much of our bodies, pain signals undergo most of their processing
in the brain. Using neuroimaging techniques like functional magnetic
resonance imaging ("fMRI") and positron emission tomography ("PET"),
researchers have more precisely identified brain regions that enable us to
experience physical pain.2 Certain regions of the brain's cortex, for example,
increase in activation when subjects are exposed to painful stimuli.'
Furthermore, the amount of activation increases with the intensity of the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. For helpful comments, I thank
Murat Aydede, Robert Coghill, Daniel Goldberg, Steve Hartwell, Ivy Lapides, Jane Ong, and
Stacey Tovino, as well as the participants in the American Journal of Law & Medicine's "Brain
Imaging and the Law" symposium and the Gruter Institute's "Law, Biology and the Brain"
conference.
Howard Spiro tells this joke in Howard Spiro, Clinical Reflections on the Placebo
Phenomenon, in THE PLACEBo EFFECT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION 37, 46 (Anne
Harrington ed., 1997).
2 See, e.g., Robert C. Coghill et al., Pain Intensity Processing Within the Human Brain:
A Bilateral, Distributed Mechanism, 82 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1934 (1999) [hereinafter
Coghill, Intensity Processing]; E.A. Moulton et al., Regional Intensive and Temporal Patterns
of Functional MRI Activation Distinguishing Noxious and Innocuous Contact Heat, 93 J.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 2183 (2005); R. Peyron, B. Laurent & L. Garcia-Larrea, Functional
Imaging of Brain Responses to Pain: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 30 NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
CLINICS 263 (2000); Carlo A. Porro, Functional Imaging and Pain: Behavior, Perception, and
Modulation, 9 NEUROSCIENTIST 354, 357 (2003); Carlo A. Porro et al., Temporal and
Intensity Coding of Pain in Human Cortex, 80 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 3312 (1998).
3 Among the areas of activation in the brain's cortex are the primary somatosensory
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex. See, e.g., Robert C. Coghill, John G.
McHaffie & Ye-Fen Yen, Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences in the Subjective
Experience of Pain, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 8538 (2003) [hereinafter Coghill,
Interindividual Differences]; Pierre Rainville et al., Pain Affect Encoded in Human Anterior
Cingulate But Not Somatosensory Cortex, 277 SCIENCE 968, 969 (1997) (using PET scans to
support "previous findings of significant pain-related activations" in the primary and
secondary somatosensory cortices, the rostral insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex).
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painful stimulus.4 These findings suggest that we may be able to gain insight
into the amount of pain a particular person is experiencing by non-invasively
imaging his brain.
Such insight could be particularly valuable in the courtroom where we
often have no definitive medical evidence to prove or disprove claims about
the existence and extent of pain symptoms. In fact, pain is one of the easiest
medical complaints to feign.5 Yet, given that pain and suffering awards may
represent about half of personal injury damage awards,6 if even a small
percentage of those awards involve feigned or grossly exaggerated symptoms,
billions of dollars may be redistributed each year to malingering plaintiffs. On
the other hand, if litigants raise genuine claims that we fail to recognize,
billions of dollars may fail to reach those who properly deserve compensation
for injuries. In this symposium article, I will argue that, despite many
conceptual and technological challenges, neuroimaging may someday play a
critical role in the evaluation of pain claims.
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has developed on how
neuroimaging may inform our understanding of deception, moral and legal
4 See Coghill, Intensity Processing, supra note 2, at 1936 ("Multiple regression analysis
of the functional imaging data revealed that a number of cerebral cortical and subcortical
areas exhibited significant, graded changes in activation linearly related to subjects'
perceptions of pain intensity."); Porro, supra note 2, at 357 ("Pain intensity-dependent
activations are found in cortical regions pertaining to the 'lateral' . .. and 'medial' . . . pain
systems . . .in the insular cortex and supplementary motor area."); see also Rainville et al.,
supra note 3 (finding that subjects given hypnotic suggestion of increased painfulness from a
heat stimulus felt more pain and had greater regional cerebral blood flow in the anterior
cingulate cortex than they did without the hypnotic suggestion); Porro, supra note 2, at 358
("Recent event-related fMRI studies also reveal cortical foci with graded responses to the
intensity of heat stimuli, activated during both perceived warmth and pain.") (citations
omitted).
5 Alan J. Cunnien, Psychiatric and Medical Syndromes Associated with Deception, in
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 23, 41 (Richard Rogers ed., 2d ed.
1997). While it is difficult to estimate how often malingering occurs, neuropsychologists who
make malingering evaluations report finding probable malingering in about 34% of chronic
pain cases in which they are asked to make determinations. Wiley Mittenberg et al., Base
Rates of Malingering and Symptom Exaggeration, 24 J. CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 1094, 1096 (2002) (based on adjusted data). Another study examined a
group of patients receiving disability benefits for chronic pain who were referred for
psychological testing because their doctors believed that their pain was largely psychological in
origin. Evidence of malingering was found in over 40% of these patients. Roger 0. Gervais et
al., Effects of Coaching on Symptom Validity Testing in Chronic Pain Patients Presenting for
Disability Assessments, 2 J. FORENSIC NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 13-14 (2001).
6 See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 102-04 (1991); Steven P.
Croley & John D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs ofAccidents: Pain and Suffering Damages
in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995); Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman
& Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (stating that pain and suffering awards "account[] for
perhaps one-half of the total tort damages paid out in the important cases of products liability
and medical malpractice"). But see Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets
Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J.
217, 235 n.84 (1993) (questioning the availability of accurate data on this issue).
See Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science, and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 339
(1998).
8 See, e.g., Charles N. W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2006); Sean Kevin
Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence
Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601 (2005); Paul Root Wolpe, Kenneth R. Foster &
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responsibility, 9 behavior prediction,"° and much more." There has been very
little analysis, however, of the societal implications of neuroimaging
technologies that provide insight into our subjective experiences, 2 even
though researchers have used neuroimaging to observe our brains while we
experience not only pain but also happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and
disgust. While we are still a long way from understanding these complicated
phenomena, neuroimaging has been and will continue to be at the forefront of
neuroscience research into the nature of subjective experience. It may well be
time to consider some of the legal and ethical issues that such technology may
raise."
Subjective experiences such as pain are private in two quite different
senses. First, they are private in the descriptive sense. No one else knows
exactly what I am feeling at a particular moment, and no one else can directly
experience my feelings. While I can infer that others are in pain, I have
uniquely direct access to my own pain. "One does not say that one is in pain
on the grounds that one is groaning and assuaging one's injured limb." s
Rather, "it is because I can introspect that I can say how things are with me
without observing what I do and say."6
Second, subjective experiences are private in the normative sense. In
some cases, we ought not be forced to reveal information about what we are
feeling. For example, one might reasonably believe that we have some
Daniel D. Langleben, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils, 5
AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39 (2005).
9 See, e.g., Patricia S. Churchland, Moral Decision-Making and the Brain, in
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 1, 3 (Judy Illes ed.,
2006); Stephen J. Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33, 33 (Judy Illes
ed., 2006) [hereinafter NEUROETHICS]; Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law,
Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y
LONDON B 1775 (2004); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience
and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006); LAURENCE
TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY (2005);
MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN (2005).
10 See Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects ofAdvances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems,
Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS, supra note 9, at 245, 246-48; Jennifer Kulynych, Note,
Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1997).
1 See generally Judy Illes, Eric Racine & Matthew P. Kirschen, A Picture is Worth
1000 Words, But Which 1000?, in NEUROETHICS, supra note 9, at 149.
12 See Hank Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal
and Social Implications ofAdvances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAw: BRAIN,
MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114, 141-42 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (mentioning the
possibility of using neuroimaging to detect and assess pain); see also Charles N. W. Keckler,
Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 544 (2006) (noting that neuroimaging techniques that reveal deception
might inform assessments of malingered pain).
13 See Lisa F. Barrett & Tor D. Wager, The Structure of Emotion: Evidence from
Neuroimaging Studies, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 79, 79 (2006); see also K. Luan
Phan et al., Functional Neuroimaging Studies of Human Emotions, 9 CNS SPECTRUMS 258,
264 (2004).
14 Stacey Tovino grapples with a wide-variety of privacy issues raised by neuroimaging
in Stacey A. Tovino, The Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 844 (2005).
15 M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE
84 (2003).
16 Id. at 85.
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interests in keeping private when we are in pain, how much pain we are in,
what triggers our pain, and how sensitive we are to pain. Such privacy
interests may partially explain why we legally restrict disclosure of medical
records. Similarly, we may have interests in keeping private other subjective
experiences like embarrassment and sexual arousal. Even though we
sometimes betray our own emotions involuntarily through comments,
gesticulation, and facial expressions, in some cases, we may plausibly have
rights to be free from certain unwanted inquiries into our subjective
experiences.
In Part II, I provide general background on the nature of pain and the
ways in which we develop evidence that other people are in pain. In Part III, I
describe how neuroimaging may, in the not-too-distant future, supplement
our evaluations of pain claims by supporting genuine claims or, possibly,
impugning malingered ones. In addition, I suggest that basic research into
pain imaging may, in the more distant future, provide increasingly objective
methods of assessing the severity of a person's pain and comparing that to the
pain of other people. Finally, in Part IV, I discuss some of the legal and
ethical issues raised by imaging technologies that reveal subjective
experiences like pain. I suggest that future pain imaging technologies are
likely to raise rather manageable privacy concerns because they would permit
only limited intrusion into the privacy of our thoughts and character.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PAIN GENERALLY
There is much disagreement over exactly what pain is, as no simple
definition adequately captures the concept. The International Association for
the Study of Pain has influentially defined the phenomenon as "[aln
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage."1 7 This
description highlights the fact that pain has several phenomenological
components. Sensory components of pain include its perceived intensity,
location in the body,"s and texture (for example, pain can be sharp, burning, or
stinging).19 The process of sensing such aspects of pain is called nociception.'0
Affective and evaluative components of pain include the emotional distress or
17 International Association for the Study of Pain, http://www.iasp-pain.org (follow
"Resources" hyperlink at top of page; then follow "Pain Definitions" hyperlink; then follow
"Pain" hyperlink).
18 Rainville et al., supra note 3, at 968.
19 PATRICK WALL, PAIN: THE SCIENCE OF SUFFERING 12 (2000) (describing sample
terms used by psychologist Ronald Melzack to characterize the sensory components of pain).
20 Cf. Colin Allen et al., Deciphering Animal Pain, in PAIN: NEW ESSAYS ON ITS
NATURE AND THE METHODOLOGY OF ITS STUDY 351, 351 (Murat Aydede ed., 2005) (describing
nociception as "the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli"); Robert C. Coghill, Pain:
Making the Private Experience Public, in PAIN: NEW EssAYs ON ITS NATURE AND THE
METHODOLOGY OF ITS STUDY 299, 300 (Murat Aydede ed., 2005) (hereinafter PAIN: NEW
ESSAYS) (describing nociception as the "reduced physical (i.e., neural) mechanisms responding
to and encoding information about actual or impending tissue damage").
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unpleasantness we associate with a sensation of pain,2 ' characterized by words
like "tiring, sickening, and annoying."2 2
The sensory and affective aspects of pain are processed, at least in part, in
different regions of the brain." In fact, some patients with disrupted
cognitive abilities due to frontal lobotomies, cingulotomies, or certain drugs,
such as morphine, report that they feel the sensory component of pain but
find it "less distressing or bothersome."24 Similarly, those with "pain
asymbolia" do not have aversive reactions to the pain of small cuts or burns,
yet they still recognize these experiences as being, in some sense, painful.25 In
rare cases, people are born completely insensitive to physical pain, having
neither sensory nor affective reactions to painful stimuli.26 This condition can
be quite devastating as the afflicted are quite prone to cuts, bruises, and more
serious injuries that those with normal pain responses know more
instinctively to avoid.
7
Because pain has both sensory and affective components, our reactions to
pain depend on more than just sensory stimuli. Pain responses are
"significantly influenced by psychosocial context, the meaning of the pain to
the individual, the patient's cultural background, and the individual's beliefs
and coping resources."2 Emotional states like anxiety and depression also
"dramatically influence[]" pain perception.2 9 Thus, "severity of pain does not
bear a simple relationship to the degree of tissue damage." 0 To take a
dramatic example, the pain associated with an injury that occurs while saving
a child from a burning building may feel far less distressing than the pain
from an otherwise identical injury that prevents a person from saving a
child." Furthermore, when pain is induced in medical experiments,
researchers tell subjects that their pain is only temporary and that subjects
21 Rainville et al., supra note 3, at 968.
22 WALL, supra note 19, at 12 (describing sample terms used to characterize affective
components of pain).
23 See FLOYD E. BLOOM ET AL., THE DANA GUIDE TO BRAIN HEALTH 169 (2006)
("Measuring the level of sensory intensity is associated with activity in the primary
somatosensory cortex, whereas the unpleasantness is associated with activity in areas of the
frontal lobe cortex usually associated with emotion . . . ."); see also Rainville et al., supra note
3, at 970 (using functional neuroimaging to support "at least a partial segregation of function
between pain affect and sensation").
24 Rainville et al., supra note 3, at 968. See also Murat Aydede, A Critical and Quasi-
Historical Essay on Theories of Pain, in PAIN: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 20, at 31-32; BLOOM
ET AL., supra note 23, at 169.
25 Aydede, supra note 24, at 32.
26 Michael Hopkin, The Mutation That Takes Away Pain, NEWS@NATURE.cOM, Dec.
13, 2006, http://www.nature.com/news/2006/061211/full/061211-11.html.
27 Id. Researchers have recently found a very rare genetic mutation that causes the
condition. Id. Assuming that everyone who has the mutation has the pain-free condition,
then the presence of the mutation provides good evidence that an afflicted person is not
experiencing physical pain. If so, this would be a very reliable, though rarely ever practical
method, of detecting malingered pain.
28 Eric Eich et al., Questions Concerning Pain, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 155, 160 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1999) (citations omitted).
29 Id.
30 Chris J. Main, The Nature of Chronic Pain, in MALINGERING AND ILLNESS
DECEPTION 171, 172 (Peter W. Halligan, Christopher Bass & David A. Oakley eds., 2003).
31 E-mail from Robert C. Coghill, Assistant Professor, Department of Neurobiology and
Anatomy, Wake Forest University School of Medicine, to Adam Kolber, Associate Professor of
Law, University of San Diego (Nov. 17, 2006, 10:36:33 EST) (on file with author).
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can cease to participate in the experiment whenever they so decide. 2 This
affects the nature of the pain experience and makes it difficult to create well-
controlled experiments that induce the kinds of pain we are likely to
experience outside the laboratory.
Pain can be roughly classified as acute or chronic, though there is little
precision in the distinction. Typically, acute pain is viewed as more
temporary or more a function of nociceptive input than chronic pain, which is
thought of as more long term and more heavily influenced by psychological
and social influences.3 Among these influences, several studies suggest that
those involved in litigation over personal injuries tend to have worse
treatment outcomes than similarly injured people who are not seeking
compensation. 5 Some cite these results to challenge compensation schemes
that, through conscious or unconscious processes, seem to increase the
severity of people's symptoms.
36
B. INTROSPECTING PAIN
When we, ourselves, are in pain, we know it automatically through
introspection. Under the traditional view, "[p]ains are said to be private to
their owners in the strong sense that no one else can epistemically access one's
pain in the way one has access to one's own pain, namely by feeling it and
coming to know one is feeling it on that basis."37 While we might infer that
someone else is in pain based on his behavior, we need not resort to such
observations to know our own pains. "[Ihf it seems to me that I am in pain
and I believe so on that basis, I am in pain."3 s According to this view, no
evidence of pain can ever be more persuasive than one's honest, immediate
first-person perceptions of the phenomenon. Thus, "if a person avows that he
is not in pain, yet evidence from PET or fMRI suggests that he is, the latter is
defeated by the agent's sincere utterance, and the inductive correlations of the
data from PET and fMRI with the subject's being in pain need to be re-
examined."3 9
Pain has also been deemed essentially subjective "in the sense that [its]
existence seems to depend on feeling [it]."4 0  Thus, it is not at all clear
whether a person can be in pain without knowing it. On the one hand, I
might plausibly say, "I was awakened by a pain in my shoulder," which seems
to suggest that my pain precedes my awareness of it. On the other hand, I
32 WALL, supra note 19, at 63.
33 See Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain, 59 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 239, 253-57 (1991).
34 See id.
35 See George Mendelson, Outcome-Related Compensation: In Search of a New
Paradigm, in MALINGERING AND ILLNESS DECEPTION, supra note 30, at 220, 222.
36 Pryor, supra note 33, at 280-91.
37 Aydede, supra note 24, at 3 (describing, though not advocating, the Cartesian view
of pains and other bodily sensations).
38 Id. at 4.
39 BENNETT & HACKER, supra note 15, at 83.
40 Aydede, supra note 24, at 4.
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might more precisely say that I was awakened by a pain precursor and that I
did not actually experience pain until I was at least partially awake.4
While pain is typically thought to be fundamentally private and
subjective, there is plenty of room for science to improve our understanding of
our reactions to pain. For example, though we have unique introspective
access to our own pain, the mere act of introspecting draws attention to pain
in a manner that intensifies the phenomenon. 2 Seeking to analyze one's pain
thereby alters its nature. Similarly, distraction from pain can ease its
intensity. 3 Expectations that pain will subside can also ease pain intensity.
When we unwittingly take placebos to treat pain, we expect our pain to
subside, and it frequently does."
Furthermore, while we may be experts about our own pain while it occurs,
our memories of pain are often inaccurate. For example, our evaluations of
painful episodes are heavily influenced by particular moments during the
episode (such as the moment when the pain is most intense) and do not
necessarily reflect accurate judgments of the total pain experienced during the
episode.45 Similarly, in a famous study, researchers showed that when we
experience physically painful circumstances that extend over a period of time,
we tend to remember especially the amount of pain felt at the end of the
interval."6 In the study, both control and experimental subjects received a
colonoscopy, a screening procedure for colorectal cancer where a colonoscope
is inserted through a patient's rectum into the lower gastrointestinal region.
4 7
In experimental subjects, however, after an ordinary colonoscopy, the
colonoscope was left in patients' rectums for an average of one additional
minute.4" During this period, patient discomfort was somewhat less than it
was when the colonoscope was more deeply inserted. The amount of pain
experienced by experimental subjects at the end of the procedure proved
41 See generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, BRAINSTORMS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND
AND PSYCHOLOGY 190-229 (1981); Ned Block, On a Confusion About a Function of
Consciousness, 18 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCi. 227, 230-36 (1995).
42 Coghill, supra note 20, at 302-03.
43 See, e.g., C.V. Bellieni et al., Analgesic Effect of Watching TvDuring Venipuncture, 91
ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 1015 (2006) (reporting that children distracted by television
during venipuncture suffered less pain than those who were not distracted).
See generally Spiro, supra note 1, at 42 (noting that expectations of improvement can
contribute to placebo effects). Neuroimaging studies have improved our understanding of
placebo pain relief, demonstrating that the brain responds in similar ways to placebo pain
relievers as it does to standard opiod drugs. The research provides fresh support for the view
that placebos can generate substantial pain relief that is much like the pain relief from
conventional analgesics. See, e.g., Ginger A. Hoffman et al., Pain and the Placebo: What We
Have Learned, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 248, 260-62 (2005) (describing the recent
neuroscience literature on placebo pain relief); Tor D. Wager, The Neural Bases of Placebo
Effects in Anticipation and Pain, 3 SEMINARS PAIN MED. 22 (2005); Tor D. Wager et al.,
Placebo-Induced Changes in JMRI in the Anticipation and Experience of Pain, 303 SCIENCE
(2004). Neuroimaging has also supported the view that patients with fibromyalgia, a chronic
pain condition, have higher than normal pain sensitivity due to "augmented central nervous
system processing of pain." Richard E. Harris & Daniel J. Clauw, How Do We Know That the
Pain in Fibromyalgia is "Real"?, 10 CURRENT PAIN & HEADACHE REP. 403, 406 (2006).
45 See, e.g., Donald A. Redelmeier, Joel Katz & Daniel Kahneman, Memories of
Colonoscopy: a Randomized Trial, 104 Pain 187, 189-92 (2003).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 187-88.
48 Id. at 188-89.
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particularly salient to their overall memory of the event. After the procedure,
compared to control subjects, experimental subjects remembered less total
pain, rated the discomfort of the colonoscopy to be less unpleasant, and were
more likely to return for follow-up colonoscopies in subsequent years.49 This
was true even though the experimental subjects, on average, had longer
colonoscopies and, as an objective matter, probably experienced more total
pain.' °
C. PAIN IN OTHERS
Despite the uniquely first-person aspects of pain, we can nevertheless still
make judgments, with some level of objectivity, about the pain of others. For
example, when a radiologist reviews a simple X-ray image of a severely
fractured leg, he can typically report with great confidence that the patient is
in pain. Thus, traditional diagnostic images are one form of evidence of a
person's pain. We also make judgments about the pain of others by
considering their self-reports. Hence, doctors diagnose and treat competent,
adult patients by asking them how they feel. Patients communicate the extent
of their pain with words, grunts, tones of voice, and perhaps facial
expressions." Doctors and pain researchers sometimes systematize these
reports by having subjects report their pain using standardized verbal
descriptions or numerical or visual scales. 2 Such standardized measurements
may give us a reasonably good sense of whether a particular subject perceives
a stimulus to be increasing or decreasing in painfulness and can also tell us
how the subject rates the pain of two different kinds of stimuli, like heat pain
compared to incision pain. 3
We also assess people's pain based on their non-verbal pain behaviors.
For example, a person may take pain medications, stay in bed, reduce total
physical activity, and limit the range of motion of a limb. 4 We must rely
heavily on our interpretations of the pain behaviors of those with limited
ability to communicate verbally, including young children. Yet, even when
our interpretations are aided by theories of brain structure and development
and rough measures of pain like change in heart rate, there is still
disagreement about, for example, whether male infants should be
49 Id. at 189-93.
50 Id. at 189.
51 See Eich et al., supra note 28, at 162-63.
52 See id. at 160 ("The primary forms of pain measurement used by clinicians with
humans experiencing pain have been verbal pain descriptors, visual analog scales, numerical
rating scales, and measurement of pain behaviors."). The McGill Pain Questionnaire is an
example of a standardized test that attempts to measure subjective pain experience using
numerical scales and standardized verbal descriptors. See Center for Gerontology and Health
Care Research, Brown Medical School, Toolkit of Instruments to Measure End-of-Life Care,
http://www.chcr.brown.edu/pcoc/Physical.htm (last visited May 9, 2007).
53 Even such intraindividual determinations are far from perfect. They require people
to recall past experiences of pain, recent as they may be, and compare them to current ones.
Yet, as noted, our memories of past experiences are quite imperfect. Eich et al., supra note 28,
at 163-64. Furthermore, the very act of describing an experience may affect the way that we
later recall it. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 40-42 (2006).
54 Jennifer S. Labus, Francis J. Keefe & Mark P. Jensen, Self-Reports of Pain Intensity
and Direct Observations of Pain Behavior: When are they Correlated?, 102 PAIN 109, 119-21
(2003).
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anesthetized before circumcision. 5  It is even more difficult to determine
when a non-human animal is in pain and whether its experience of pain is
phenomenologically like yours and mine.56
III. MALINGERING AND PAIN VALUATION
A. PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES
When a defendant tortiously injures a plaintiff, in addition to pecuniary
damages like medical expenses and lost earnings, the plaintiff can seek
compensation for non-pecuniary damages, like pain and suffering. The
phrase "pain and suffering" is broadly construed in legal contexts to permit
recovery "not only for physical pain but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety,
worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment,
apprehension, terror or ordeal."5 7 I will focus on damages for physical pain,
though these other experiences no doubt play central roles in the experience
of physical pain and cannot be neatly compartmentalized.
There is much disagreement over the fundamental purposes of our tort
regime and, hence, disagreement over the fundamental reasons why we
compensate people for their tortiously-caused pain. Typically, tort theorists
principally seek either to reduce societal harm s or to achieve corrective justice
by putting aggrieved litigants in the position they would have been in were
their rights not violated.5 9 Either way, however, our tort system must make
inferences about the magnitude of people's pain if it is going to optimally
deter future harmful behavior or correct harms that have already occurred.
Despite the importance of pain assessment to tort law, we nevertheless
have few ways to confidently evaluate pain claims, particularly because
litigants often have incentives to exaggerate. People can lie about their pain
experiences and can, to varying degrees, fake their pain behaviors.
Evaluations of pain claims are particularly difficult when, as is often the case,
medical evidence in the form of traditional diagnostic images tells us little
55 See J. Lander et al., Comparison of Ring Block, Dorsal Penile Nerve Block, and
Topical Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision: a Randomized Controlled Trial, 278 JAMA
2157 (1997); N. Wellington & MJ Rieder, Attitudes and Practices Regarding Analgesia for
Newborn Circumcision, 92 PEDIATRICS 541, 541 (1993).
56 Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans
and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 182-91 (2001). Answers to such questions may not
alone settle matters about animal cruelty and consumption, but depending on one's underlying
views, they may well inform the debate. For example, in challenging the lack of protection we
give to the interests of animals, Peter Singer forcefully argues that most animals can indeed
feel pain. "Nearly all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can be seen
in other species .. . " including "writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms
of calling, attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its
repetition, and so on." PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 11 (2d ed. 1990).
57 Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972).
58 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970) ("Apart from the
requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to
reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.").
59 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 543-50 (1972) (outlining features of corrective justice).
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about a patient's pain condition. Those reporting chronic low back pain
frequently have no observable physical findings to support their claims.6 0
In particular, a pain assessment tool ought to help distinguish genuine
pain symptoms from those that are faked. The current edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM") uses two
principal classifications to describe those who are lying about their symptoms.
It describes malingering as "the intentional production of false or grossly
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external
incentives such as . . . obtaining financial compensation."' Similarly, those
with "factitious disorder" also intentionally feign symptoms, though they do so
"in order to assume the sick role,"6" rather than to avoid work or obtain
compensation.6 3
The mere fact that a person can offer no physical evidence of pain,
however, does not mean that his reported symptoms are disingenuous. In
some cases, we simply may not have the diagnostic tools to find that physical
evidence. Also, it is well-established that patients may experience genuine
chronic pain that is largely attributable to psychological factors. 64  For
example, those with what the DSM deems "somatoform disorder" have
physical symptoms that "are not fully explained by a general medical
condition."65 "Pain disorder," a kind of somatoform disorder, "is characterized
by pain as the predominant focus of clinical attention" where "psychological
factors are judged to have an important role in its onset, severity,
exacerbation, or maintenance. '66 Ideal pain assessments tools would also help
explain the extent to which a person's pain is caused by psychological factors
as opposed to physical trauma or decay. The results would certainly be
important in treatment decisions and perhaps also in damage assessments.67
In tort and other compensation schemes, factfinders try to assess pain
claims by considering the credibility of complainants and by permitting expert
testimony.6s For example, doctors might testify about tests performed on a
60 Research in the late 1970s found that over three-quarters of those with compensable
worker's compensation claims associated with low back pain had no physical findings
supporting their complaints. John D. Loeser, Low Back Pain, in PAIN 363-77 (John J. Bonica
ed. 1980). Despite improvements in our ability to detect physical injuries, it often still difficult
to identify the cause of someone's back pain. See Gina Kolata, With Costs Rising, Treating
Back Pain Often Seems Futile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9AO4EFDF173AF93AA35751CO
A9629C8B63 (quoting Dr. Richard Deyo, a professor of medicine and health services at the
University of Washington as stating that "[a] variety of studies have suggested that in 85
percent of cases it is impossible to say why a person's back hurts.").
61 Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 739 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
62 Id. at 513.
63 Id.
64 See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 285, 303-06
(2005).
65 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 61, at 485.
66 Id. at 485, 498-503.
67 See generally Cornelius Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New
Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1355, 1379, 1386-96 (1974) (suggesting that, in some
circumstances, tortfeasors ought not be liable for pain exacerbated by psychological features of
the defendant, even when the tortfeasor is a cause-in-fact of the pain).
68 See generally CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION (Richard
Rogers ed., 1997); Friedland, supra note 7, at 340.
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litigant. One standardized clinical assessment designed to identify "non-
organic" low back pain was originally published in 1980.69 Among the tests
used as part of the assessment, doctors check whether a patient experiences
pain when the lower part of his back is lightly touched.70 Patients whose pain
has a traditional physical explanation are not expected to experience increased
pain.' Those who claim to experience increased pain when lightly touched
may be faking or may have pain that is not explained by what were
traditionally called "organic" symptoms. 72 In any event, those assessed as
having principally non-organic symptoms are likely to have a "poor response
to 'straightforward' physical treatment."73  Tests of this sort are often
inconclusive, however. Furthermore, this particular assessment tool was
never intended and has never been validated for use in legal contexts.7 4 In
addition, if a witness is coached as to the "appropriate" pain responses, he can
fake those responses rather easily.
In the 1960s, a number of researchers began touting an "objective" pain
detection technique based on thermography.7 Thermography uses infrared
radiation to measure body surface temperature. 76 Some have claimed that
these temperature readings can reveal soft tissue injuries or other painful
conditions that do not appear in other diagnostic images.77 Indeed, in a
number of studies, thermography has shown promise as a means to
supplement more traditional medical evidence.78 The technique has a high
rate of false positives, however, and has never been part of mainstream
medical practice. 79 Litigants seeking to admit thermographic evidence have
had only mixed success.80
69 Gordon Waddell et al., Nonorganic Physical Signs in Low Back Pain, 5 Spine 117,
117-25 (1980).
70 Id. at 118.
71 Such superficial tenderness, it has been claimed, "is almost always present in
patients motivated by financial secondary gain and almost never in patients with well-
demonstrated physical pathologic conditions that improve appropriately." P. Douglas Kiester
& Alexandra D. Duke, Is It Malingering, or Is It 'Real'?, 106 POSTGRADUATE MED., Dec.1999,
http://www.postgradmed.com/issues/1999/12_99/kiester.htm.
72 1 doubt that pain conditions can be divided neatly between those that are principally
"organic" and those that are principally "psychological." Such categories can, however, serve as
helpful shorthand expressions for what is certainly a much more complex distinction in pain
etiology.
73 Main, supra note 30, at 174.
74 Id.
75 See Douglas R. Dalgeish & Teresa J. Stewart, Thermography in Missouri's Courts: Is
the Frye StandardAlive and Well?, 60 UMKC L. REV. 467, 475 (1992).
76 Id. at 474.
77 Id. at 474-475.
78 Andrew B. Lustigman, Comment, A New Look at Thermography's Place in the
Courtroom: A Reconciliation of the Conflicting Evidentiary Rules, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 419, 427-
30 (1990).
79 See id. at 419-20, 430-31.
so For cases finding thermographic evidence inadmissible, see, for example, McAdoo v.
United States, 607 F. Supp. 788, 795 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Burkett v. Northern, 715 P.2d 1159,
1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Ferlise v. Eiler, 495 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
For cases permitting thermographic evidence, see, for example, Cherico v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp., 758 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd without opinion, 96 F.2d 12 (3d
Cir. 1992); Procida v. McLaughlin, 479 A.2d 447, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
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B. STRUCTURAL IMAGING OF CHRONIC PAIN
Where thermography has generally failed, neuroimaging may someday
succeed. A promising method of detecting chronic pain relies on one of the
newest methods of magnetic resonance imaging known as diffusion tensor
imaging ("DTI"). s1 DTI allows us to examine the naturally-occurring diffusion
of water molecules in brain tissue. The results allow us to "probe tissue
structure at a microscopic scale well beyond the usual image resolution." 2 It is
currently "the only approach available to track brain white matter fibers
noninvasively"s3 and has "been used to demonstrate subtle abnormalities in a
variety of diseases including multiple sclerosis and schizophrenia.""4
At the annual meeting of the Radiological Society of North America in
November 2006, a German research team announced that they used DTI to
identify changes in brain structure associated with chronic low back pain. 5
The researchers used DTI to scan the brains of twenty subjects with a
confirmed diagnosis of chronic low back pain and twenty healthy control
subjects, and found identifiable structural differences in the brains of healthy
subjects compared to chronic pain sufferers. s6 According to one member of
the study team, the "results reveal that in chronic pain sufferers, the
organization of cerebral microstructure is much more complex and active in
the areas of the brain involved in pain processing, emotion and the stress
response." 7
The results and details of the experiment have yet to be published, so it is
too early to assess its significance. If the research holds up to scrutiny, it may
someday lead to a promising method of distinguishing genuine chronic pain
sufferers from malingerers. If chronic pain causes changes in the brains of
sufferers that make their brains recognizably distinct from those of
malingerers, we may have a method of identifying certain malingered claims.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that one can consciously create these sorts of
structural changes to one's brain, making it difficult or impossible to fake the
claim that one experiences chronic low back pain. It might also make it
difficult to claim falsely that one does not experience such pain when one
really does, were one seeking a physically demanding job in, say, the military.
81 On the principles of diffusion tensor imaging, see Alexandre F. M. DaSilva et al., A
Primer on Diffusion Tensor Imaging ofAnatomical Substructures, 15 NEUROSURGICAL Focus 1
(2003); Denis Le Bihan et al., Diffusion Tensor Imaging: Concepts and Applications, 13 J.
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 534 (2001). While DTI has principally been used as a
method of structural brain imaging, there is some evidence that it can also be an effective new
tool in functional neuroimaging. Le Bihan et al., Direct and Fast Detection of Neuronal
Activation in the Human Brain with Diffusion MRI, 103 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 8263 (2006).
82 Le Bihan et al., supra note 81, at 534.
83 Id. at 543.
84 Id.
85 Press Release, Radiological Society of North America, Chronic Back Pain Linked to
Changes in the Brain (Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.rsna.org/rsna/media/pr2Oo6-
2/chronicback pain-2.cfm.
86 Abstract, Radiological Society of North America, Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI)
Danisotropic Changes in the Brain Associated with Chronic Low Back Pain (Nov. 29, 2006),
available at http://rsna2oo6.rsna.org/rsna2OO6/V2006/conference/event-display.cfm?em
id=4433436.
87 Press Release, Radiological Society of North America, supra note 85.
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Of course, this research is still quite preliminary, and there are many
reasons to remain cautious about its prospects. First, we need to know more
about the significance of the identified structural changes in the brain. It is
not clear whether chronic pain caused structural changes in the brains of
sufferers or whether sufferers might have been predisposed to develop chronic
pain because of certain features of their neuroanatomy. Second, it is not yet
clear whether the group of chronic pain sufferers in the experiment included
those with psychogenic pain as well as those with pain explained by
traditional physical explanations. Third, the current results make
generalizations about groups of sufferers compared to groups of controls: the
technology does not distinguish the brain structure of an individual pain
sufferer from anyone else's. 8 Fourth, the results are based on a small number
of subjects, apply to just a particular kind of chronic pain, and have yet to be
published and replicated by other researchers. Finally, whatever technology
might eventually derive from this research, it will likely have some rate of false
positives and false negatives. We would then have to decide whether the error
rates are acceptable for some particular contextual application of the
technology. Nevertheless, the results suggest a promising path for further
research: there may, indeed, be structural differences in the brains of chronic
pain sufferers that we may someday be able to reliably identify with non-
invasive brain imaging techniques.
C. MEASURING PAIN MORE GENERALLY
While malingerers entirely fabricate or grossly exaggerate claims, it is far
more common that those seeking compensation engage in a more modest
form of symptom exaggeration that arises during adversarial or administrative
proceedings. In fact, even claimants who do not exaggerate their symptoms
may still have difficulty accurately conveying the nature and extent of their
pain. Thus, malingering detection is just a part of the much broader, more
important, and less tractable task of valuing pain generally. Such valuation is
notoriously difficult and explains why "compensation for pain and suffering is
widely perceived as one of the tort beast's uglier heads."8 9
The Restatement (Second) of Torts acknowledges just how difficult it is to
value pain and suffering in court:
88 This sort of research typically uses group data, though the details of this particular
experiment have yet to be made public.
89 Croley & Hanson, supra note 6, at 1789.
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There is no direct correspondence between money and harm to
the body, feelings or reputation. There is no market price for a
scar ... since the damages are not measured by the amount for
which one would be willing to suffer the harm. The discretion of
the judge or jury determines the amount of recovery, the only
standard being such an amount as a reasonable person would
estimate as fair compensation.... The most that can be done is
to note such factors as the intensity of the pain or humiliation, its
actual or probable duration and the expectable consequences.
Since these factors are all indefinite.. ., it is impossible to require
anything approximating certainty of amount even as to past
harm.9°
Pain valuation raises two distinct sets of questions: (1) How do we
determine the quality and quantity of pain the plaintiff has experienced and
will experience? and (2) Assuming we know the quality and quantity of pain a
plaintiff has experienced and will experience, how do we attach to it a
monetary value? The second question is essentially a normative one about
how and why we ought to compensate people for tortiously-caused pain. For
example, should the tort system fundamentally seek to compensate people for
pain they have wrongfully experienced, or should it simply impose penalties
on wrongdoers to deter future violations? For any given amount of pain, is
there some unique, objectively fair way to value it? Contrary to the
Restatement, should people be compensated for pain based on the amount of
money it would take for them or for a reasonable person to voluntarily
experience that pain?
Yet, once we get past these evaluative questions, we will still face the
difficult empirical inquiry in the first question. Even if we agree that a given
amount of pain should be compensated with a particular amount of money,
how do we know how much pain a person is experiencing? How do we assess
its duration and intensity? These issues are particularly challenging when
subjects have incentives to be less than forthcoming. But even when people
are entirely forthcoming, challenges persist whenever we try to communicate
the deeply subjective, first-person nature of pain experiences. 91
Suppose that A and B are both given an identical pain stimulus (for
example, they are each poked in the hip with identical force by a hot piece of
metal). Even if they rate their experiences numerically equal on a scale of 1-
10, they may feel different amounts of pain but simply use identical numerical
values to describe their pain. Pain with a value of 5 to one person may not be
experienced in the same way as pain with a value of 5 to another. Consider,
for example, that some pain scales inform subjects that a value of 10
represents the worst pain imaginable.92 If so, subjects with more vivid
imaginations may rate their pain lower than those who are less imaginative.
Furthermore, even the process of eliciting self-reports may affect pain
measurements, as subjects tolerate pain longer when queried by an
experimenter of the opposite sex than of the same sex and when queried by a
go RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1977).
91 See generally DANIEL GILBERT, supra note 53, at 46-53.
92 WALL, supra note 19, at 11-12.
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faculty experimenter rather than a student experimenter.93 Thus, even if we
had a perfect lie detector, we could still benefit from a pain detection
technology that more objectively conveys pain intensity.
Similar problems persist when relying on non-verbal pain behaviors. The
pain that makes one person cry does not necessarily have the same effect on
another. The level of back pain that leads one person to stay home from work
may be viewed as quite tolerable by another. Combining pain behavior data
and self-reports may give us our best current evidence to make intersubjective
determinations of pain. But even these behaviors are not perfectly correlated.
A meta-analysis that compared self-reported pain measurements with
measurements based on directly observed pain behaviors found only a low to
moderate correlation. 9 The study authors concluded that "[r]esearchers and
clinicians should avoid using either of these measures as a proxy for the other,
and should rely on multiple sources of information about pain." s
D. FUNCTIONAL IMAGING OF ACUTE PAIN
Once again, there may be-in the more distant future-a role for
neuroimaging to assist in making intersubjective determinations of pain. In
2003, Robert Coghill and fellow researchers conducted an experiment using
functional neuroimaging that may eventually inform our judgments of the
relative pain experiences of different people. 96 The researchers exposed
human subjects to acute pain-a heat stimulus-and had them rate the
intensity of the pain on a scale of 1-10. Subjects had a wide range of pain
sensitivities, with the most sensitive subject rating a 49'C heat stimulus as 8.9
out of 10, while the least sensitive subject rated this stimulus at 1.05 out of
10.97 Based on such introspective reports, subjects were categorized into high,
medium, and low sensitivity groups.9
The researchers then compared the areas of brain activation under fMRI
of the high sensitivity and the low sensitivity groups. The high sensitivity
group showed more frequent and more robust activation than the low
sensitivity group in those areas of the cortex associated with pain intensity.99
The researchers took these results to "validate the subjective report" ° ° as an
interindividual measurement, because subjects who rated their pain lower on
numerical scales generally had less activation in regions of the brain
associated with pain than did subjects who rated their pain higher on the
numerical scale."'
93 Ibolya Killai, Antonia Barke & Ursula Voss, The Effects of Experimenter
Characteristics on Pain Reports in Women and Men, 112 PAIN 142, 144 (2004).
94 Jennifer S. Labus, Francis J. Keefe & Mark P. Jensen, Self-Reports of Pain Intensity
and Direct Observations of Pain Behavior: When are they Correlated?, 102 PAIN 109, 119
(2003).
95 Id.
96 Coghill, Interindividual Differences, supra note 3.
97 Id. at 8539.
98 Id. at 8541.
99 Id. at 8538, 8541.
100 Id. at 8542.
101 Id. at 8541 (stating that the "concurrence between multiple individuals' patterns of
regional brain activation and their subjective reports of pain provides an objective context in
which to assess the subjective report of any given individual").
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It is far too early to say whether this basic research will have practical
applications. The technology faces several obstacles. First, as with the DTI
data mentioned earlier, Coghill's team examined data across groups of
subjects. This method does not yield inferences about the experiences of
individual subjects. Until we can make pain assessments of individuals, the
technology will have few everyday applications in law or medicine. Second, it
is not yet clear precisely how uniform are the brain structures and
mechanisms that generate our experiences of pain. Brain function is quite
plastic and may vary considerably from person to person."°2 Also, different
kinds of pain have quite different fMRI patterns of activation. °3 The less
uniform are our experiences of pain, the more difficult it will be to compare
one person's pain to another's. Furthermore, at least in the courtroom, we are
more likely to seek measurements of chronic pain, rather than the acute pain
measured by Coghill's team.
Finally, one of the greatest challenges to creating a successful pain
detector-particularly one that relies on functional as opposed to structural
imaging-is that unwilling subjects may develop countermeasures.' For
example, we can develop some control over our heart rates, skin conductance,
and performance on EEGs,' and thereby frustrate a variety of mechanisms
designed to detect lies. We do not yet know the extent to which we can
control the activation of particular brain regions in order to purposely
generate inaccurate fMRI images.' One study suggests that, without any
coaching, merely imagining pain will be insufficient to create the appearance
of actual pain under fMRI. 7 At different times, subjects in the study
experienced pain from a noxious stimulus and pain from hypnotic suggestion.
At other times, subjects were asked to merely imagine feeling pain. When
group data were analyzed, more activation was observed in pain regions of the
brain when subjects experienced physical pain than when they experienced
hypnotically-induced pain (though activation was observed under both
conditions).' When merely imagining pain, however, subjects demonstrated
little or no increase in activation in the brain's pain regions. 10 9
On the other hand, with some training, we can develop control over the
activation of pain regions of the brain."0 Subjects given feedback from real-
time fMRI images were able to increase or decrease activation in regions of
102 See, e.g., Coghill, Intensity Processing, supra note 2, at 1934 (stating that even
subjects who have an entire "cerebral hemisphere surgically removed retain the capacity to be
consciously aware of a painful stimulus presented ipsilateral to their remaining hemisphere"
and that "[q]uantitative psychophysical analysis of these subjects reveals that they have almost
no disruption of their capacity to experience and evaluate pain intensity").
103 E-mail from Robert C. Coghill to Adam Kolber, supra note 31.
104 See Jennifer Granick, The Lie Behind Lie Detectors, WIRED, Mar. 15, 2006, available
at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70411-O.html (claiming that fMRI lie detection
is subject to simple countermeasures because "a subject can defeat the test by breathing deeply
or by holding her breath").
105 R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control Over Brain Activation and Pain Learned by
Using Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Sm. 18626, 18626 (2005).
106 See id.
107 Stuart W.G. Derbyshire et al., CerebralActivation During Hypnotically Induced and
Imagined Pain, 23 NEUROIMAGE 392 (2004).
108 Id. at 395.
109 Id.
110 deCharms, supra note 105, at 18626.
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the brain associated with pain perception and experienced corresponding
increases or decreases in the amount of pain they experienced."' While this is
a promising result for those seeking to treat pain, it complicates efforts to
measure pain.' 2 Successful methods of pain detection that use functional
imaging (as opposed to harder-to-manipulate structural imaging) may require
the development of countermeasures to thwart subjects' own efforts at fooling
pain detectors.
The challenges involved in making intersubjective pain determinations
suggest that applications of the technology are a long way off. Surely, it will
be more difficult to assess the amount of pain a person suffers than it will be
to identify those whose pain claims are entirely fake. Importantly, however,
our methods of intersubjective pain comparison need not be perfect; our
current methods of assessing a complainant's pain are far from it. So long as
pain measurement using neuroimaging is a cost-effective supplement to our
current system, the technology may well play a valuable role in medical
diagnosis and perhaps pain dispute resolution.
IV. THE PRIVACY OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
A. PAIN DETECTION AND SOCIETY
So far, I have shown how neuroimaging has already informed our
understanding of pain phenomena. I have also shown how, despite numerous
technological challenges, neuroimaging may someday serve as a valuable aid
in determining whether a cooperative-or perhaps even an uncooperative-
subject is experiencing pain."3 Let us make the plausible supposition that a
reliable method of neuroimaging for chronic back pain is developed that by
itself, or in conjunction with other medical evidence, allows us to reach
substantially more confident conclusions about the presence or absence of
chronic back pain in a particular subject than we can now.
Such a pain detector could have many uses, especially by healthcare
providers. For example, doctors might use the test to make medical
diagnoses. Depending on its abilities, the detector might help reveal the
extent to which a patient's back pain is due to physical tissue damage or to
more psychological factors. It might also provide evidence of malingering,"4
III Id. at 18626, 18628-30.
112 See id. at 18627-30 (finding that subjects taught to control pain intensity using real-
time fMRI feedback were significantly more successful than those taught other strategies to
control pain that lacked fMRI feedback). The harder it is to learn pain control techniques, the
harder it is to fool a pain detector and the more meaningful will be attempts to cross-examine
people about whether they have practiced countermeasures.
113 Importantly, for statistical reasons, it may be easier to use neuroimaging to support a
pain claim than to rebut one. E-mail from Robert C. Coghill to Adam Kolber, supra note 31.
114 Though it did not involve malingered pain as such, one neuroimaging study has
suggested that PET scanning can play a valuable role in distinguishing subjectively
experienced paralysis from simulated paralysis. The study explicitly mentions the possible
application of this technology to the detection of malingered paralysis claims. See N.S. Ward,
D.A. Oakley & R.S.J. Frackowiak, Differential Brain Activations During Intentionally
Simulated and Subjectively Experienced Paralysis, 8 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 295, 310-
11 (2003); see also CRAIG W. MARTIN, WORKERS' COMP. BOARD OF BRITISH COLUMBIA -
EVIDENcE BASED PRACTICE GROUP, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION SERVICES DIVISION,
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leadings doctors to be either more cautious or more confident when
prescribing narcotics and when writing up diagnoses to support insurance or
disability claims.
Again, depending on the capabilities of the technology, doctors might also
use a back pain detector to assess the condition of those who are unable to
communicate because they have cognitive or motor impairments or are too
young to speak. In fact, neuroimaging has already been used to better
understand the cognitive capacities of those who cannot communicate. In
September 2006, researchers reported using fMRI to image the brain of a
patient believed to be in a persistent vegetative state while the patient was
asked to imagine certain tasks, like playing tennis or moving around in her
home."' The patient demonstrated activation in cortical regions of the brain
that was indistinguishable from the brain activation observed in healthy,
aware control subjects.' While there is much dispute over one
neuroscientist's claim that the results provide "knock-down, drag-out"117
evidence of consciousness in this patient,"8 the results show promise that
functional neuroimaging will give us new insight into the thoughts and
experiences of those unable to communicate."9
In addition to clinical applications, a reliable method of chronic back pain
detection could be useful for health insurers and employers. Health insurers
might require patients to demonstrate that they have chronic back pain prior
to reimbursing treatment.' Whether insurers would actually do so might
largely depend on the cost of the pain detection procedure, assuming they
would have to reimburse it. Similarly, if costs are not prohibitive, employers
in physically demanding industries like firefighting or the military might use a
pain detector in medical screenings of new job applicants to weed out those
who will be unable to perform well or who are disproportionately likely to
require expensive medical care. 2'
A reliable pain detector could have many uses in dispute resolution,
including worker's compensation cases,' Social Security disability
hearings,"' settlement negotiations and mediations, and civil (and perhaps
DETECTING MALINGERERS' HIDDEN TRUTHS? (2003), http://www.worksafebc.com/
health care providers/Assets/PDF/ detecting-malingerers.pdf.
15 Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE
1402, 1402 (2006).
116 Id.
17 Benedict Carey, MentalActivity Seen in a Brain Gravely Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
8, 2006, at Al.
18 See Neil Levy, Persistent Vegetative States and Consciousness, Neuroethics & Law
Blog, http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics-law blog/2006/O9/persistent-vege.html.
119 Because we cannot ask those who are unconscious about their pain experiences,
however, it would be extremely difficult to know if our assessments based on diagnostic images
are valid measures of pain. See generally Mendelson, supra note 35, at 225 (discussing
diagnostic validity).
120 On the use of neuroimaging by insurers more generally, see Tovino, supra note 14, at
847-48.
121 See id. at 847 (discussing limits on the use of such tests imposed by the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
122 See Pryor, supra note 33, at 257-291 (discussing the relevance of pain adjudication to
Social Security disability determinations).
123 See id. at 291-304 (discussing the relevance of pain adjudication to worker's
compensation cases).
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even criminal) trials. To be useful in such settings, the pain detector must
satisfy the pertinent venue's requirements for presenting scientific evidence.
Federal courts and some state courts require that expert testimony satisfy the
standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."4
Under Daubert, trial judges are required to determine if proffered scientific
evidence is sufficiently reliable for admission by considering, inter alia,
whether the kind of evidence presented has been: (1) empirically tested, (2)
subjected to peer review and publication, (3) shown to have acceptably low
error rates, and (4) generally accepted in the pertinent scientific
community." 5 Other state courts apply the older standard established in Frye
v. United States,'26 which, focusing on the fourth prong of the Daubert
standard, permits admission of expert evidence that is generally accepted by
the pertinent scientific community. 27
For purposes of our current investigation, we may counterfactually
assume that the pain detection method at issue has enjoyed widespread
acceptance by the medical community and is deemed highly reliable by the
courts. With that assumption, litigants who purport to have chronic back
pain may voluntarily introduce pain detection evidence to bolster their claims.
Of course, even if litigants can do so, they will still have to demonstrate other
elements of their causes of action. For example, in tort litigation, plaintiffs
will still have to show that their chronic pain was wrongfully caused by
defendants' breach of a duty to the plaintiff.
In other cases, litigants may prefer not to introduce pain detection
evidence, yet may be required to do so in order to pursue their claims. For
example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, when the mental or
physical condition of a party is "in controversy," the court can order a party to
undergo a medical or psychological examination "on motion for good
cause."'28 Because the rule can effectively force a litigant to undergo tests into
matters that are deeply personal, it is considered "one of the most intrusive
forms of discovery."' 29 The rule presses the boundary between our interests in
public dispute resolution and our interests in maintaining the privacy of states
of physical and psychological suffering. If neuroimaging turns out to be as
powerful a tool as some think it will be, then it may also enable courtroom
prying into pains, emotions, thoughts, and feelings that we might otherwise
succeed in concealing.
B. PAIN PRIVACY
In 2005, a group of researchers provocatively declared that "[f]or the first
time, using modern neuroscience techniques, a third party can, in principle,
bypass the peripheral nervous system-the usual way in which we
communicate-and gain direct access to the seat of a person's thoughts,
124 509 U.S. 579, 589-94 (1993).
125 Id. at 592-95.
126 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
127 Id. at 1014.
128 FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
129 Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Science Fact or Science Fiction? The Implications of Court-
Ordered Genetic Testing Under Rule 35, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 295 (2000).
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feelings, intention, or knowledge."3 ° Such possibilities have raised fears that
neuroimaging may someday threaten fundamental interests in the privacy of
our minds. For example, Lynette Reid and Franqoise Baylis state that "the
starting assumption is that, intentions aside, others cannot 'read our thoughts'
and so invade our privacy"' because "[o]ur thoughts-that is, our reasoning,
our motivations, our attitudes, beliefs, and values-are our selves and our
personal identity.'
3 2
It is questionable whether neuroimaging can ever, even in principle, give
us direct access to the seat of a person's thoughts or experiences. There is
little dispute, however, that neuroimaging can, in principle, allow us to make
reasonable inferences about the thoughts or experiences of others. For
example, as a primitive first step, Yukiyasu Kamitani and Frank Tong have
used fMRI to determine the orientation of an image shown to subjects
without relying on their self-reports. 3 Others claim that fMRI may someday
give us reliable information about a subject's memories of a person or a crime
scene or may reveal more generally whether a subject is being deceptive.'3 4
Similarly, revelations of certain kinds of experiences-even if they are not
thoughts in themselves-have the potential to allow inferences to be made
about private matters. For example, fMRI experiments have identified brain
regions associated with sexual arousal 5 that could potentially reveal a
person's sexual proclivities or orientation. Other fMRI experiments seek to
identify neural correlates of unconscious racial bias.136 Applications of either
sort of research could someday raise interesting privacy questions were
neuroimaging to be used in litigation over sexual harassment or employment
discrimination.
130 Wolpe et al., supra note 8, at 39.
131 Lynette Reid & Franqoise Baylis, Brains, Genes, and the Making of the Self, 5 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 21, 22 (2005) ("What is novel and particularly interesting about privacy and
confidentiality with neuroimaging ... is the predicted-and unprecedented-access to human
thought.").
132 Id.
133 Yukiyasu Kamitani & Frank Tong, Decoding the Visual and Subjective Contents of the
Human Brain, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 679, 679 (2005).
,34 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 1602 (suggesting that brain imaging could be used
someday to reveal whether a person being interrogated recognizes a person in a photograph).
See generally Charles N.W. Keekler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural
Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 509 (2006) (suggesting that the
"ability to examine in real time the response of the subject brain during a question and answer
session makes it feasible to use [functional imagining] forensically, provided that the pattern
of brain activity corresponding to deception is sufficiently well-characterized"); Nicholas
Wade, Improved Scanning Technique Uses Brain as Portal to Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2005, at A19. One company, "No Lie MRI" has begun selling fMRI-based lie detection
services, and a competitor, "Cephos Corp.," plans to do so in the near future. See No Lie MRI,
Inc., http://www.noliemri.com (last visited May 9, 2007); Cephos Corp.,
http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited May 9, 2007).
135 Jorge Ponseti et al., A Functional Endophenotype for Sexual Orientation in Humans,
33 NEUROIMAGE 825 (2006). See also Bruce A. Arnow et al., Brain Activation and Sexual
Arousal in Healthy, Heterosexual Males, 125 BRAIN 1014 (2002).
136 See generally Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2006); Mary
E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice and Stereotyping. Social-Cognitive
Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 56 (2005); William A.
Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces,
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PAIN DETECTION
The use of pain detection in tort litigation, however, is not likely to raise
privacy concerns of the same magnitude as could be raised by the courtroom
detection of these other kinds of experiences. There are many reasons for this,
and I will mention four. First, pain implicates weaker privacy interests
because we are less likely to draw inferences (accurate or otherwise) about a
person's character based on his experiences of pain than from, for example,
his subjective experiences that reveal race or gender bias. Pain is more likely
to generate sympathy for the sufferer than animus.
Second, we may have weaker privacy interests in our pain experiences
because such experiences permit rather limited inferences about our thoughts.
For example, one's state of chronic pain likely reveals little about his political
and social views, while one's aversive reactions to certain societal groups may
reveal much more. Certain measures of subjective experience have been
thought, at least in principle, to reveal a great deal about our thoughts. As
Justice Clarence Thomas has written when permitting blanket exclusion of
polygraph evidence from criminal cases, "[t]he common form of polygraph
test measures a variety of physiological responses to a set of questions asked
by the examiner, who then interprets these physiological correlates of anxiety
and offers an opinion to the jury about whether the witness ... was deceptive
in answering questions about the very matters at issue in the trial."3 7 Were a
reliable polygraph developed, it would represent a measurement of subjective
experience that has the potential to invade strong privacy interests in our
thoughts.
Thus, part of what makes pain privacy interests a bit weaker than our
privacy interests in certain other experiences is that pain imaging implicates
fewer of our background norms protecting thought privacy. While it is as yet
unclear the extent to which the privacy of our thoughts is respected by law,
there are many cases that speak approvingly, especially in the First
Amendment context, of the importance of our "freedom of thought" and
"freedom of mind."3 ' In Stanley v. Georgia,'39 for example, the Supreme
Court stated that "[olur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds."' More recently, in
upholding a due process right to consensual sodomy, the Court wrote in
Lawrence v. Texas that "[flreedom extends beyond spatial bounds" and that
137 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998).
138 See Linda MacDonald Glenn, Keeping an Open Mind: What Legal Safeguards Are
Needed?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39 (2005); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental
Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1989)
(arguing that the First Amendment limits intrusive government interference with our mental
processes). For cases mentioning "freedom of mind" or "freedom of thought," see, for example,
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) ("The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the
same security as freedom of conscience."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 536 (1958) ("For
there can be no true freedom of mind if thoughts are secure only when they are pent up.");
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("We begin with the proposition that the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."). I have argued elsewhere
that we are entitled to a certain "freedom of memory," that is one component of our "freedom
of mind." See Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1567, 1622-1626 (2006).
139 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
140 Id. at 565.
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"[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."' Dicta in these cases
suggest that we have rights to thought privacy, though it is not at all clear how
courts will apply the language that is suggestive of such rights.
Laws protecting the confidentiality of medical information may well be a
step toward protecting pain privacy. 4 2 Yet, we give much greater protection
to medical information that reveals intimate thoughts rather than just private
pains. For example, an article on the front page of the Wall Street Journal
tells the story of Patricia Galvin who was in an automobile accident in 2001.' 43
Galvin sought to collect disability payments from her insurer but was denied
on the grounds that she was capable of returning to work. Her insurance
company denied coverage based, at least in part, on information contained in
the notes of Galvin's psychologist whom she had been seeing in therapy both
before and after the accident. The insurance company gained access to these
notes by taking advantage of a loophole in regulations of medical privacy
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act."M Galvin was
quite upset that the insurance company could gain access to her psychologist's
notes, stating "I feel like now I have no privacy.... My most private thoughts,
my personal tragedies, secrets about other people, are mere data of a
transaction, like a grocery receipt."4 The point being, no one claims that
Galvin should have been able to keep private whether or not she actually
experienced disabling pain that entitled her to disability payments. Rather,
she had a privacy interest in the thoughts she expressed to her therapist that
happened to bear on questions about her pain.
Third, while there are certainly those who seek to project an image of
strength and imperviousness to pain, more typically, people share news of
their distress with doctors, friends, co-workers, and sometimes even strangers.
The search for a sympathetic ear may lead people to talk too much rather than
too little about their pain.'46 So rather than focusing on the "privacy" of
subjective experience, it is worth remarking that many people have little
interest in keeping their pain private. Importantly, the right to "publicize"
one's pain by being allowed to admit neuroimaging evidence of it in court may
prove much more important than the right to keep pain experiences private.
Thus, because we are generally less disposed to keep secret our pain, as
opposed to other subjective experiences like sexual arousal, we may have a
reduced expectation of pain privacy.
Finally, in the context of civil litigation over pain and suffering damages,
the privacy interests at risk from an accurate pain detector do not seem
141 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
142 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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Erosion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at Al.
144 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2006).
A5 Francis, supra note 143.
146 In fact, even when we want to, it can be difficult to disguise our subjective
experiences of pain. See Marilyn L. Hill & Kenneth D. Craig, Detecting Deception in Pain
Expressions: The Structure of Genuine and Deceptive Facial Displays, 98 PAIN 135, 135 (2002)
(claiming that "there is an empirical basis for discriminating genuine and deceptive facial
displays").
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particularly strong because our tort regime already expects litigants to offer or
respond to medical evidence concerning their pain. Thus, we have already
decided that one's physical pain is an appropriate subject of factual inquiry in
court for which medical evidence is admissible. Not only do we admit medical
evidence of pain and suffering to prove such damages, in most cases, it is
affirmatively required. Moving from traditional diagnostic images to modern
neuroimaging technologies presents only an incremental change in our
practices.
Incremental as it may be, the transition would still raise interesting
questions: How do we treat incidental findings of brain tumors or of other
subjective experiences that are discovered when using neuroimaging to
investigate pain? 147 Could the use of a reliable pain detector reveal too much
about the credibility of a witness, such that pain detection testimony invades
the province of the jury?"4 s Should jurors be shown actual neuroimages when
hearing expert testimony in court, or are they likely to be "seduced" into giving
too much weight to evidence that may seem more reliable than it really is? 9
These questions, however, are variations on familiar ones about how to
manage inadvertently discovered medical information, how to limit the scope
of expert testimony, and how to provide evidence to jurors in a format that
will encourage more accurate factual determinations. Pain imaging is less
likely to raise the kinds of novel questions about our freedom of thought that
might well be raised by the use of neuroimaging to assess certain other kinds
of subjective experiences.
147 See generally Judy Illes et al., Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research, 311
SCIENCE 783 (2006) (asserting that "[aJll investigators engaged in brain imaging research
should anticipate incidental findings in their experimental protocols and establish a pathway
for handling them").
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Detection, WIRED MAGAZINE Jan. 2006, at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.01/
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determine the credibility of a complainant's claims of suffering with a biological metric.
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V. CONCLUSION
In his famous essay, "What is it Like to be a Bat?," Thomas Nagel argues
that reductionist accounts of mental phenomena have great difficulty
explaining subjective experiences.'5 ° Even if we knew everything there is to
know about the neuroscience of bats, we still would not know what it is like to
be a bat-to have the "subjective character of experience" that a bat has. 5'
When it comes to understanding the experiences of other humans, the
problem is somewhat easier.5 2 Because our brains are similar, we infer that
other people have experiences like our own. Nevertheless, our subjective
experiences are fundamentally private, such that they are difficult to
transparently convey and are correspondingly easier to fake. As we become
technologically better at penetrating the privacy of our experience in the
descriptive sense, we will increasingly need to consider the privacy of our
experience in the normative sense. Given the technological plausibility of at
least primitive pain detection and the important role it could play in medical
diagnosis and in legal disputes, it may not take long for incremental questions
about the scope of pain privacy to begin to appear.
150 THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 165-180 (1979).
151 Id. at 166-67.
152 See id. at 171-72 (stating that an "ascription of experience is possible only for
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